Abstract. The Ministry of Internal Affairs of Georgia has submitted an administrative offense case to the Tbilisi City Court, in which Tornike Razmadze is charged with petty hooliganism under Part 1 of Article 166 of the Code of Administrative Offenses (hereinafter referred to as the Code of Administrative Offenses) for a post published on the social network “Facebook” and the content of the comment left under it. The article analyzes whether the case materials meet the requirements of the composition of this article and administrative proceedings.
This analysis is structured according to the hierarchy of norms: the Constitution of Georgia, international standards, the substantive norm of the ASC, procedural requirements, burden of proof, and quality of evidence. Each quote has been verified against the primary source.
I. Factual outline of the case
The case file consists of eleven unique documents. The following are essential for the analysis:
1. Administrative Offense Protocol No. Be 000135195, drawn up on September 1, 2026 , place of drawing up — Tbilisi, Gulua Street No. 10 (Administrative Building of the Ministry of Internal Affairs). Protocol details:
Date of commission of the offense: 18.08.2026 ;
Essence of the offense: “ On August 18, 2026, Tornike Razmadze used abusive and insulting words on the social network “Facebook” ”;
Norm: Article 166, Part 1 of the Criminal Code;
The body hearing the case: Tbilisi City Court;
Witness column — blank ;
Victim's column — blank ;
The entry in the offender's signature box: " Was not present at the scene ."
2. Protocol on the examination of evidence , 31.08.2026. Establishes that on August 18, 2026, a video post was published on the profile “Tornike Razmadze” with the text “ This is the plan for the Russification of Georgia: ”, and “ under the mentioned post ” from the same profile “ on June 12, 2026 ” a controversial comment was left. The protocol does not quote the text of the comment — it attaches a screenshot on which the comment is marked as “1w” (one week ago) by the Facebook interface.
3. Protocol on identification , 31.08.2026 — Based on Article 244, Part 3 of the Criminal Procedure Code, the profile photo material was uploaded to a "special electronic program" and the person was identified "as a result of a visual examination of the face."
4. Information and Analytical Department reports , 31.08.2026: Administrative records exist (only traffic violations and one other violation, none under Article 166); criminal records — “No information available.”
5. Covering letter to the court — 01.09.2026; Court entry stamp — 07.09.2026.
Two axes of analysis can already be read from these five documents: (a) whether the words published on the Internet are covered by Article 166 and (b) whether the action recorded in the protocol has been established.
II. Constitutional Framework
1. Article 17 — Freedom of expression and the right to freely use the Internet
Article 17 of the Constitution of Georgia states :
“1. Freedom of opinion and expression shall be protected. Persecution of a person on account of opinion and expression shall be prohibited. […] 4. Everyone has the right to access and use the Internet freely. 5. Restrictions on these rights may only be permitted in accordance with the law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national or public security or territorial integrity, for the protection of the rights of others, to prevent the disclosure of information held in confidence, or to maintain the independence and impartiality of the judiciary.”
Paragraph 4 has an independent meaning: Internet access is an independently defined constitutional right, while the list in paragraph 5 is exhaustive . “Public order” — the good protected by Article 166 — does not appear directly in this list; it can only be pursued as a legitimate aim of restriction within the framework of “public safety” or “rights of others,” which in both cases implies a higher threshold of interference than the abstract protection of morality.
2. Article 31, paragraph 9 — Definition of the norm of liability
No less essential for this case is the requirement of certainty (foreseeability) . According to the established practice of the Constitutional Court:
"Predictable and unambiguous legislation, on the one hand, ensures the protection of a person from the arbitrariness of the law enforcement officer , and on the other hand, establishes a guarantee that a person receives a clear message from the state in order to be able to correctly perceive the norm, determine which actions are prohibited by law and which actions may result in legal liability."
— No. 2/2/516,542, 14.05.2013, “Alexander Baramidze and Others against the Parliament of Georgia”, II-30
The same decision also provides a test for vagueness: “ A law may be considered indefinite when all methods of interpretation have been tried, but its true content is still unclear, or the essence is clear, but the scope of its application is unclear ” (II-31).
Practice also links this principle to the separation of powers:
“Vague legislation gives the court applying the norm the opportunity to determine, at its own discretion, the composition of the prohibited action in the absence of an appropriate normative framework. Accordingly, in such a case , the issue of declaring the action punishable is decided not by the legislator, but — in each individual case — by the judicial authority, which contradicts the constitutional principle of the separation of powers. ”
— №2/1/1289, 15.07.2021, “Giorgi Beruashvili vs. the Parliament of Georgia”, II-7
In this case, the court recognized unconstitutional part of the normative content of the words “or other anti-social act” in the first part of Article 171 of the Criminal Code precisely because of its indefiniteness. At the same time, the court does not prohibit the use of general terms in principle: “ It is permissible to adopt a general legislative norm establishing liability that is subject to interpretation within the limits of reasonableness ” (II-12). I.e. The criterion is interpretability within the limits of reasonableness, not the possibility of interpretation in any direction.
3. "The ripple effect"
The Constitutional Court singled out a specific threat to freedom of expression:
“The right […] of the Constitution of Georgia experiences a “restrictive effect” if a person, fearing an expected sanction, is forced to refrain from fully exercising the right, and self-restriction is reflected even in the normatively unrestricted part of freedom of expression. Due to the influence of the “restrictive effect”, the impact of the norm on the realization of freedom of expression may go beyond the scope of its regulation.”
— No. 2/2/516,542, II-8
This argument in this case is not just abstract: if Article 166 applies to emotional comments left under one's own post, the scope of self-censorship includes every political discussion on a social network.
III. International Standard
1. Two Georgian cases in Strasbourg — and why it matters which one the case under consideration resembles
The European Court of Human Rights has considered two Georgian cases under Article 166 of the ECHR, and their results are opposite. It is the difference between these two cases that is important for assessing the case at hand.
(a) Peradze and Others v. Georgia , No. 5631/16, 15.12.2022 (entered into force 15.03.2023) — Violation found.
The applicants were fined under Article 166 of the Criminal Code for carrying a vulgar poster at a rally against Panorama Tbilisi. The European Court of Human Rights found a violation of Article 11 in conjunction with Article 10. Three reasons are decisive:
“ The domestic courts did not address in their decisions the question of the degree of disturbance to public life caused by the applicants’ conduct , and the Court finds this to be a deficiency in relation to the proportionality requirement of Article 11 § 2.” (§ 43)
“The national courts unjustifiably divorced the vulgar nature of the impugned statement from its context and apparent purpose , focusing solely on its form. […] It is also significant that the impugned insulting statement was not directed against any specific individual or institution, which is why it cannot be considered as an insult or gratuitous humiliation of any specific person .” (§45)
“The Court considers that the imposition of a sanction, however mild, for expression forming part of a legitimate public debate may have an undesirable ‘chilling effect’ on freedom of expression. ” (§46)
(b) Miladze v. Georgia , No. 41585/23, 19.05.2026 — No violation found.
The applicant was fined under Article 166, Part 1 of the Criminal Code of Georgia for a video posted on TikTok, which contained obscene language and attacks on the Mayor of Tbilisi and law enforcement officers. The European Court of Human Rights unanimously found no violation of Article 10. (The first page of the decision states: “ Request for referral to the Grand Chamber pending ” — i.e. the case is not yet final.)
This decision cannot be ignored. But its reasoning shows why it does not apply to the case at hand. The court itself distinguished itself from Peradze :
“The present case clearly differs from Peradze and Others , which also concerned the use of obscene language in public debate. In that case, the impugned expression was not directed at any identifiable individual, but rather at a construction project. In the present case, by contrast, the domestic courts found that the impugned phrases were directed at specific public officials .” (§72)
“The Court reiterates that statements which take on the character of a targeted and humiliating attack on identifiable individuals may fall outside the protection of Article 10.” (§71)
Additionally, in Miladze , the court outlined mandatory criteria for assessing online expression:
“Such interference must be assessed in the light of the following criteria: the content of the impugned statements, the context in which they were made, their reach and potential impact, the reasoning of the domestic courts and the proportionality of the sanction imposed. ” (§70)
and stressed that the Georgian courts had in fact carried out this analysis: “ they had examined the content, tone, purpose and potential impact of the applicant’s statements; had recognised the public interest dimension of the debate; and had clearly distinguished between strong political criticism and hostile personal humiliation ” (§ 76). The absence of a violation, in other words, depended on the quality of the domestic courts’ reasoning.
What does this mean for the case at hand? Miladze forbids the absolute argument that online expression cannot be limited in principle by Article 166. But the same decision places the case at hand on Peradze ’s side: (1) the victim column in the offense report is blank , no addressee is named; (2) the case file contains no data on the “reach and potential impact” of the action — neither the number of views nor the number of shares (cf. Miladze §75: over 100,000 views, 600 shares); (3) the “degree of concern for public life” is not described, which the court is explicitly required to investigate under Peradze §43; (4) the subject of the protected post — “Russification of Georgia” — is a political issue of public interest.
2. The issue of vulgarity as such
In both Georgian cases and their predecessors, the European Court repeats the same formula:
“ The use of vulgar phrases is not in itself decisive in assessing offensive expression, since it may serve only a stylistic purpose. For the court, style is part of communication, as a form of expression, and as such is protected together with the content of the ideas and information expressed.”
— Savva Terentyev v. Russia, №10692/09, 28.08.2018, §68; with the same wording Peradze §37 and Miladze §68
“The Court emphasises that not every expression which may be perceived by particular individuals or groups as offensive or degrading justifies […] a conviction. […] Only by carefully examining the context in which the offensive, degrading or aggressive words appear can a meaningful distinction be drawn between shocking and offensive language, which is protected by Article 10, and that which falls short of the right to tolerance.”
— Savva Terentyev, §69
The requirement for strict interpretation is formulated in the same case as follows: “ It is vital that […] criminal law provisions clearly and precisely define the scope of the relevant offences and that these provisions are strictly interpreted , in order to avoid a situation where the State’s discretion […] becomes excessively broad and potentially abusive through selective enforcement ” (§85).
3. Reach and audience scale
On the issue of proving access: “ It is clear that the reach and, therefore, the potential impact of a statement published on the Internet with a small readership is certainly not the same as that of a statement published on […] heavily visited websites. Accordingly, in order to assess the potential impact of an online publication , it is essential to determine the extent of its access to the public ” (§79). No such determination was made in the present case.
4. Political speech
“The margin of acceptable criticism is accordingly wider in relation to a politician as such than in relation to a private individual. […] He inevitably and consciously places himself […] under close scrutiny and must therefore display a higher degree of tolerance .” — Lingens v. Austria , No. 9815/82, 08.07.1986, §42
“The margin of permissible criticism is wider with regard to the Government than with regard to a private citizen or even a politician. […] The dominant position which the Government occupies makes it necessary for it to exercise restraint in resorting to punitive proceedings , especially when other remedies are available.” — Castells v. Spain , No. 11798/85, 23.04.1992, §46
5. The applicability of Article 6 of the Convention — an often overlooked argument
Article 166 of the Criminal Procedure Code provides for administrative detention for a period of up to 20 days . According to Engel 's criteria, the nature and severity of the sanction determine whether a formally administrative charge is a "criminal charge" for the purposes of Article 6:
“In a legal order based on the rule of law, the “criminal” sphere includes deprivation of liberty which may be imposed as a penalty , except in cases where, by their nature, duration or manner of execution, they cannot have a manifestly harmful character.” — Engel and Others v. the Netherlands , No. 5100/71 et al., 08.06.1976, §82
The European Court of Human Rights has directly extended this to administrative offences: Ziliberberg v. Moldova , No. 61821/00, 01.02.2005, §§33, 35 (fine of ~3 euros — nevertheless, the charge is criminal, since the fine is “ of a punitive and deterrent nature ”); Kasparov and Others v. Russia , No. 21613/07, 03.10.2013, §§42–45; Mikhaylova v. Russia , No. 46998/08, 19.11.2015, §§51, 64; and in particular:
“Having regard to its earlier case-law relating to administrative offences punishable by imprisonment, the Court considers that the criminal part of Article 6 of the Convention is applicable .” — Karelin v. Russia , No. 926/08, 20.09.2016, §42
It follows that the entire arsenal of Article 6 applies to the case at hand, including the presumption of innocence (“ The presumption of innocence is breached when […] the burden of proof shifts from the prosecution to the defence ” — Karelin , §72) and the requirement to detail the charges :
“Article 6 § 3 (a) entitles the accused to be informed not only of the cause of the accusation, that is to say, of the acts of which he is accused and on which the accusation is based, but also of the legal classification of those acts. This information […] must be detailed .” — Pélissier and Sassi v. France [GC], no. 25444/94, 25.03.1999, § 51
“The accused must in any case be provided with as much information as is necessary to fully understand the scope of the charges against him in order to prepare an adequate defence.” — Mattoccia v. Italy , No. 23969/94, 25.07.2000, §60
IV. Composition of Article 166 of the Criminal Code
1. Text of the norm
"Petty hooliganism - cursing in public , insulting citizens , and other such actions that violate public order and/or the peace of citizens - will result in a fine of 500 to 3,000 GEL or administrative imprisonment for a term of up to 20 days."
— Article 166, Part One, of the Criminal Procedure Code (Consolidated Edition No. 639, 24.06.2026)
According to the first paragraph of the note, the person will additionally be deprived of the right to carry weapons for a period of up to 3 years — the actual severity of the sanction will not be exhausted by the fine.
The composition is three-fold: (a) the place of action - public space ; (b) the addressee of the action - citizens ; (c) the result - a violation of public order and/or the peace of citizens. All three are cumulative.
2. Element “Public Space”: No legal definition exists
The term “public space” was introduced into Article 166 by Law No. 273 of February 6, 2025 ; previously, the norm stated “in public places.” None of these terms are defined in the Civil Code, its general part, or the amending law .
The only legislative definition in Georgian legislation that comes close to this concept is Article 3, Subsection “h⁴” of the Spatial Planning, Architectural and Construction Activities Code , and it cannot support the accusation for two reasons:
" h⁴) Public space - a registered or unregistered space adjacent to a plot of land that is used for public purposes, namely, a street, road, highway, alley, sidewalk, lawn, garden, square, water mirror, landscaped and recreational zone, public road, easement and other similar space;"
First: This definition begins with the words “for the purposes of this Code” — i.e. its operation is limited to the same Code. Second: It is strictly physical — a space that is adjacent to a plot of land. A social network page is not adjacent to a plot of land.
The systemic argument is also important: in adjacent norms, the legislator uses spatially bound formulations — Article 166¹ (sexual harassment) says “ in public places ,” while Article 166² (vandalism) lists “ in a square, on a road, in a park, in a square, in an underground passage .” The Child Rights Code uses the term “public space” three times — and does not explain it once.
3. Supreme Court: The place of online action cannot be determined
On June 4, 2026, the Supreme Court (Administrative Cases Chamber, No. BS-422(G-26)) decided the arbitration dispute on the alleged violation of Article 166 on a social network. Its reasoning is crucial for the analysis of the composition:
“The Court of Cassation notes that the current legislation does not provide a legal definition of the place of commission of an administrative offense. According to the general definition, the place of commission of an offense is considered to be the place where the act was directly, physically carried out/committed by a person […]”
“Thus, the alleged offense was committed on a social network, in virtual space, which is why it is impossible to accurately determine the place where it was committed, physically […]. In addition, at this stage there is no valid legislative regulation that, under similar factual circumstances […], would unambiguously determine the place, physical territory, where the offense was committed. ”
The Supreme Court, out of practical necessity for determining jurisdiction, introduced the “place of occurrence” test. But its recognition that the place of an online action is not determined by the legislation directly echoes the Constitutional Court’s Beruashvili standard: when the scope of a norm is not established by the legislator and is determined by the judiciary in each individual case, there is a problem of determinacy.
It should also be noted that the Miladze decision confirms (§§22, 40–42): Georgian courts justify the extension of Article 166 to cyberspace by the Supreme Court decision No. 1559-1462-2012 of 2014 and the Kutaisi Court of Appeal decision No. 4/A-183-20 of 07.05.2020. The practice exists — but this is precisely judicial practice, not the will of the legislator, and applies to the old version of the norm (“public place”). In addition, the Kutaisi Court of Appeals' decision No. 4/A-400-21 of 29.09.2021, cited in §42 of the same decision, distinguishes two nuances: an action on Facebook cannot be considered to have the same "immediate or comprehensive effect", since other users need time to become aware of the post, and a distinction is made between content shared publicly and with limited settings.
4. Element "Addressee"
The Constitutional Court based the legitimate purpose of Article 166 precisely on the right of the addressee:
“When one person curses another person, in addition to violating public order, there is also a risk of violating the right to privacy of the recipient of the curse […]” (II-10)
“The moral and psychological integrity of a person, including protection from verbal attacks and the guarantee that they will “leave it alone,” constitutes a good protected by the constitutional right to privacy” (II-13)
— Ruling No. 2/12/1643, 27.12.2024, Maia Todua and Mikheili Tsurtsumia against the Parliament of Georgia
(For methodological accuracy: this is a ruling on the refusal to accept the claim for consideration on the merits, on the grounds of unfoundedness. It is not a substantive confirmation of the constitutionality of Article 166 — accordingly, the issue of the constitutionality of the new wording of the norm is open. At the same time, the quoted passages are part of the court's reasoning on the legitimate purpose of the norm and, as such, are of guiding significance.)
In the case under consideration, the addressee does not exist in the documents: the victim's column in the protocol is blank, no person is named, there is no complaint, and there is no witness. This is not a matter of assessment, but of fact.
5. Identity of the addressee and competition of articles: Articles 166, 173 and 173¹⁶ of the Criminal Procedure Code
The element of the addressee has an independent, systemic dimension, which remains completely undeveloped in the case file. The legislator, by Law No. 273 of February 6, 2025 — the same act that introduced “public space” in Article 166 — built administrative liability for insults into a three-tier system, differentiated by the identity of the addressee :
Art. 166, Part I — Addressee: “Citizens” in public space. Connection with official duties: None. Sanction: 500–3,000 ₾ or up to 20 days.
Article 173, Part II — Addressee: law enforcement, military, penitentiary, enforcement police officer, probation officer (closed list). Connection with official duty: “during the performance of official duty or in connection with the performance of […]”. Sanction: 2,000–5,000 ₾ or up to 60 days.
Art. 173¹⁶, Part I — Addressee: State-political and political official, civil servant, person equated with him, public servant. Connection with official duty: “during the performance of official duty or […] in connection with the performance or activity .” Sanction: 1,500–4,000 ₾ or up to 45 days.
The first part of Article 173¹⁶ repeats the vocabulary of Article 166 verbatim, but for the official addressee circle:
" Vocal insult, cursing, insulting or other offensive actions against a Georgian state-political official, political official, civil servant, person equated with a civil servant and/or public servant during the performance of official duties or in connection with the performance of official duties or activities (except for cases provided for by the Criminal Code of Georgia) shall result in a fine of 1,500 to 4,000 GEL or administrative imprisonment for a term of up to 45 days."
The Prime Minister is directly included in this circle: Subparagraph “t” of Article 3 of the Law of Georgia “On Public Service” designates as a state-political official “the President of Georgia, a member of the Parliament of Georgia, the Prime Minister of Georgia , another member of the Government of Georgia and his deputy […]”. (It is noteworthy that Article 173¹⁶ of the Civil Service Code itself is neither accompanied by a note explaining these terms, nor does it refer to this law - the transfer of definitions is an interpretative step, not a legislative one.)
Four conclusions follow from this.
First: there is no gap, i.e. Article 166 is not a residual norm. Upon examining the full text of the Code of Administrative Offenses, only five norms establish liability for insult: Article 166 (citizens), Article 166¹ (sexual harassment), Article 171, Part 2 (acts offensive to morality, without an individual addressee), Article 173, Part 2, and 173¹⁶. The words “deputy,” “member of parliament,” and “prime minister” do not appear anywhere else in the Code. Accordingly, the legislator created a special norm for insulting an official, and there was no need for the widespread application of the general norm.
Second: A special norm replaces a general one. When the legislator regulates the same factual composition — verbal insult of an official — with a separate norm, the application of a general norm (Article 166) to the same action contradicts the principle of lex specialis .
Third: The risk of arbitrary choice between norms. Articles 166 and 173¹⁶ are listed in the same way in Part 13 of Article 239 of the Criminal Code (the protocol is drawn up by the MIA body), in Article 208 (the city court is to be tried), and in Part 1¹ of Article 262 (3-day period). That is, the same agency chooses between two different norms for the same action — and the choice is not neutral: the sanctions are different, and according to paragraph 2 of the note to Article 173¹⁶, Article 22 of the Criminal Code (verbal warning) is already excluded for the first part , while in Articles 166 and 173 it is excluded only for repeated commission. In the words of the Constitutional Court, “ vague and incomprehensible legislation creates fertile ground for arbitrariness ” (No. 3/7/679, II-29, cited in No. 2/1/1289, II-8).
Fourth: The element of connection with official duties is not read mechanically. In both special norms, insult must be related to official duties. The Tbilisi Court of Appeal, in the case of online expression, completely dismissed the charge under Part 1 of Article 173 due to the absence of this element:
“The Court of Appeal found that the lower court had erred in determining one key element of the alleged misconduct, namely that the insult must have been directed at a law enforcement officer in the performance of his or her official duties . The Court of Appeal noted that the TikTok video contained an insult directed at law enforcement officers in general, precisely because of their status , and was not directed at any specific officer performing his or her official duties at that time.”
— Miladze v. Georgia, §31 (description of the decision of the Tbilisi Court of Appeal of 11.05.2023)
The addressee's trilemma
Applying this system to the case at hand leaves the state with three choices , each of which invalidates the charge.
(a) The addressee is not named. This option actually corresponds to the case materials: the victim’s column in the protocol is blank, the witness’s column is blank, and there is no complaint. Then the second element of Article 166 — “insulting attacks on citizens ” — is not fulfilled, and Peradze ’s logic is applied: “The disputed insulting statement was not directed against any specific individual or institution, which is why it cannot be considered an insult to any specific person ” (§45).
(b) The addressee is considered to be a state-political official. In that case, the applicable norm is Article 173¹⁶, not Article 166 —i.e., the charge (offence) is incorrectly qualified. In addition, Article 173¹⁶ also requires that the insult be related to the performance of official duties or activities; public commentary on the subject of the Russian propaganda narrative does not reveal such a nexus, and the appellate practice cited above shows that the court strictly examines this element. It also remains valid that the margin of criticism against a politician and the government is the widest and the state should in such a case show “restraint in resorting to punitive proceedings” ( Lingens , §42; Castells , §46).
(c) The addressee is considered to be a representative of the information space of a foreign country. In that case, Article 173¹⁶ cannot be applied — this person is neither a state-political official nor an employee of Georgia. With regard to Article 166: the protected good of the norm is “public order and/or the peace of citizens ”, i.e. the peace of society in Georgia; a person living abroad is not in this circle, has not filed a complaint, is not a party to the case, and is not named in the protocol. In addition, a statement made on the topic of the Russification of Georgia is the core of political speech — the most strictly protected category of expression.
(The article deliberately does not name the persons who are not named in the case materials. The trilemma is hypothetical and shows precisely that the administrative body has an unidentified addressee — which in itself is a failure to comply with the requirement of Part 1 of Article 240 ("essence of the offense").)
Two additional notes about the system
Procedural paradox. Part 2 of Article 252 of the Criminal Procedure Code , which establishes the mandatory presence of a person, names Articles 166 and 173–173², but does not consider Article 173¹⁶ . That is, a norm with a stricter sanction provides a weaker procedural guarantee — no rational explanation is sought for this and indicates an internal inconsistency of the system.
Insult is not punishable by criminal law. Defamation in Georgia was decriminalized by Law No. 224 of June 24, 2004 (Article 148 of the Criminal Code was removed), and the general element of “insult” never existed in the Code. Today, insulting an official is criminally punishable only in two narrow cases — contempt of court (Article 366) and insulting a military serviceman (Article 387) . In other words, the general policy of the legislator is that verbal insult is the subject of a civil-legal dispute, and administrative liability is an exception, which is allowed for precisely defined official categories. (By Law No. 992 of October 16, 2025, Article 353³ was added to the Criminal Code, which punishes the commission of the same act by a person subject to the penalty under Part 3 of Article 173 of the Criminal Code with imprisonment; there is no analogous norm for Article 173¹⁶.)
International assessment of Article 173¹⁶
The Venice Commission’s Urgent Opinion CDL-AD(2025)001 (3 March 2025, adopted at the 142nd plenary session, 14–15 March 2025) refers directly to Article 173¹⁶ (§12) and notes, in relation to the 60-day detention in its second part, that “such sentences appear particularly harsh and disproportionate and require revision ” (§47); and in its general assessment, that the amendments “contain a number of vague and broadly formulated provisions which grant the authorities an excessively wide discretion in their application ” (§53).
The OSCE/ODIHR Urgent Opinion FOPA-GEO/564/2025 (12 November 2025), which discusses the “new Article 173¹⁶”, concludes in its summary: “ Such vague and broad terminology, which encourages subjective interpretation, fails to meet the standards of legality, clarity and foreseeability required by international law. It carries the risk of erroneous, overly broad, arbitrary and/or deliberate enforcement against legitimate criticism of public officials ” and concludes that the amendments “ should be repealed ”.
(The ODIHR report of March 14, 2025 has a separate subsection entitled “Insults Against State Officials” (pp. 38–39), however, the text of this subsection was not available at the time of writing; therefore, its content is not included here.)
6. Element "Result"
The norm requires that the action “ violates public order and/or the peace of citizens” — i.e. the result is an element of the composition, not a presumption. Peradze §43 directly links the need to examine this element to proportionality. No external manifestation of the violation of order is described in the case file.
In this context, it is worth noting one test established in the practice of the Supreme Court, which concerns the assessment of minor importance, but also highlights the element of consequence: a verbal reprimand is justified when the action “ has not caused such damage and/or such a violation of state or public order, citizens’ rights and freedoms […] that would necessitate imposing administrative liability on the person who committed it ” (№BS-1411(K-22), 23.04.2024).
V. Procedural requirements and their observance
1. Place of drawing up the protocol
Part 1 of Article 240 of the Criminal Procedure Code lists “ the place, time and nature of the administrative offense ” as a mandatory requirement of the protocol. The Supreme Court has given this requirement procedural weight:
“The Court of Cassation explains that […] it follows from the requirements established for the protocol of an administrative offense under Article 240 and from the significance of the protocol of an administrative offense itself as a legal document that it is necessary to draw it up precisely at the place of the offense . […] Thus, drawing up a protocol of an administrative offense not at the place where the offense was detected constitutes a substantial violation of the procedure. ”
— No. BS-1853-1807(K-10), 27.12.2011; with the same wording No. BS-585-575(K-12) and No. BS-785-769(K-12), 05.03.2013
In the case under consideration, the report was drawn up in the administrative building of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (10 Gulua Street), while the physical location of the alleged act is not determined, and the report itself indicates the place of commission not as a place, but as a platform (“Facebook”). This circumstance can hardly be considered even a formal fulfillment of the requirement provided for in Part 1 of Article 240.
2. Explanation of rights and attendance of the person
Article 240, Part 4 of the Criminal Procedure Code: “ When drawing up a protocol, the violator shall be explained his rights and obligations under Article 252 of this Code, which shall be noted in the protocol. ” The Supreme Court directly requires the body to examine this requirement (№BS-585-575(K-12) and №BS-785-769(K-12), 05.03.2013).
In the protocol under consideration, the signature column of the offender indicates that he was “not present at the scene”. Hence: the rights could not be explained; the opportunity to provide explanations was not given; there is also no record of refusal to sign the protocol, which is required by Part 3 of Article 240 (since there was no refusal - the person was not there). The case file does not show whether the person was summoned to draw up the protocol.
In addition, Part 2 of Article 252 of the Criminal Procedure Code directly names Article 166 in the list of cases where “ the presence of a person held administratively liable is mandatory .” According to Part 1¹ of the same article, imposing a penalty in absentia is permissible only for the articles listed exhaustively — Article 166 is not in this list .
3. Deadline for consideration of the case
Article 262, Part 1¹ of the Code of Administrative Offenses: “ Cases of administrative offenses provided for in Articles 45, 45¹, 166, 173 and 173¹⁶ of this Code shall be considered within 3 days. ” The material was sent to the court on 01.09.2026, entry stamp — 07.09.2026. The legislator did not establish the three-day period by chance: it balances the particularly intrusive sanction (imprisonment) of the norm with the speed of the process.
4. Discernment
The first part of Article 261 of the Code of Administrative Offenses: “A case of an administrative offense shall be considered at the place of its commission ,” and Article 166 is not included in the exceptions to Part 2 (consideration by place of residence) — which the Supreme Court directly confirmed in Case No. BS-422(G-26). This means that the adjudication depends on the indication of the place of commission in the protocol; and the place, in the strict sense, is not indicated in the protocol.
5. About seniority — for accuracy
According to Article 38 , Part 2 of the Criminal Procedure Code, the period for imposing a penalty in a case for the City Court to decide is 6 months from the date of commission. From 18.08.2026, this period expires on February 18, 2027. The limitation argument does not exist in this case and raising it would only weaken the position.
VI. Production and Burden of Proof
1. The burden is clearly on the body
By Law No. 273 of February 6, 2025, Section 3 was added to Article 236 of the Criminal Procedure Code and the title of the article was changed:
" The burden of proving an administrative offense lies with the administrative body conducting the administrative offense case. "
— Article 236, Part 3 of the Criminal Code
This norm is new and there is no Supreme Court interpretation of it yet. But its text leaves no ambiguity: the defense is not required to prove anything, including that a “public space” did not exist or that order was not violated.
Article 7 of the Law "On Freedom of Speech and Expression" operates in the same direction:
“1. Any restriction of the rights recognized and protected by this law shall be based on irrefutable evidence . 2. […] Any doubt which cannot be proved in accordance with the procedure established by law shall be resolved against the restriction of these rights. […] 5. In considering the question of granting the status of opinion or fact, any reasonable doubt […] shall be resolved in favour of granting the status of opinion .”
(Important clarification: By Law No. 825 of June 26, 2025, paragraph 6 of this article — which directly stated that “in the event of a restriction of freedom of speech, the burden of proof lies with the initiator of the restriction” — was repealed . Therefore, it can no longer be relied upon; paragraphs 1 and 2, however, remain in force and yield almost the same result.)
The status of opinion is granted absolute protection by Article 4, paragraph 1 of the same law : “ Opinion is protected by absolute privilege. ” While Article 8, paragraph 1, allows for restrictions only “ by a clear and foreseeable, narrowly targeted law .”
2. Point of view neutrality
According to Article 9, paragraph 1, subparagraph “c” of the same law, substantive regulation is permitted in relation to “face-to-face insult or insult in a public space .” The history of this norm is noteworthy: by Law No. 3375 of March 20, 2015, the “public insult” part was removed from this subparagraph, and for ten years the law allowed substantive regulation only for “face-to-face insult”; “insult in a public space” was returned only by Law No. 825 of June 26, 2025. In addition, paragraph 2 is categorical: “Substantive regulation may be implemented only in the form of a viewpoint-neutral, non-discriminatory restriction .” The issue of selective enforcement — to which Savva Terentyev §85 directly refers — follows from this and is substantiated by a documentary series of comparable cases.
3. Grounds for termination of production
Article 232 of the Code of Administrative Offenses: “Procedures for administrative offenses shall not be initiated, and those initiated […] shall be terminated: a) if there is no fact of administrative offense ; […]”. It is on this basis that, according to the practice of the Supreme Court, a number of proceedings initiated under Article 166 have been terminated, which subsequently turned into cases of moral damage (see, for example, No. BS-542(K-25), 24.07.2025; No. BS-1170(K-19), 18.09.2023; No. BS-861(K-25), 29.12.2025).
VII. Quality and reliability of evidence
This section is not concerned with the interpretation of the law—only with what the case file confirms in its own text.
1. Internal contradiction of the date of action
The protocol lists 18.08.2026 as the date of the offense and does not mention the comment anywhere — its wording is: "He used abusive and insulting words on the social network "Facebook".
The inspection report states that on 18.08.2026, a post was published with the text “This is the plan to Russify Georgia:” — a phrase that does not contain any swearing or offensive words — and the disputed comment was left on “ June 12. ”
Two mutually exclusive conclusions are possible from this, and both are against the authority:
If the subject of the administrative offense is the action of 18.08.2026 (as stated in the protocol), then there is no evidence in the case that abusive words were used on that day — the text recorded on that day does not contain any insults;
If the subject of the accusation is a comment , then the date of the commission in the protocol is incorrect, and the date indicated in the viewing protocol (12.06.2026) is logically impossible, since the comment is two months older than the post “under which” it was left. In the screenshot itself, the Facebook interface marks the comment as “1w”. Accordingly, the case materials do not allow us to determine which date is correct, or to what extent the aforementioned screenshots reflect reality.
In both cases, the requirement of Article 240, paragraph 1, of the Criminal Code to indicate the “time” of the commission and the standard of detailing the charges under Article 6, paragraph 3 (a) of the Convention are violated ( Pélissier and Sassi , §51; Mattoccia , §§59–61).
2. The subject of the offense is not recorded in writing.
Neither document cites the disputed statement. The wording of the protocol is blanket, and Pataki describes the action as a continuation, in very general terms (“ He uses abusive and insulting words through a social network ”) — instead of a specific, one-time act and fact. This simultaneously hinders the preparation of the defense and effectively makes impossible the analysis of the norm that Miladze §70 requires: an assessment of content, context, and stylistic purpose.
3. No access and impact data
Savva Terentyev §79 and Miladze §75 state the scale of access as a necessary element of the assessment. The case does not record the number of views, shares, comments, the size of the profile audience, nor the visibility settings of the post. This gap is especially important given that the conclusion of the absence of a violation in Miladze was based precisely on the proven 100,000+ views and 600 shares.
4. Facial recognition identification
The protocol is based on Part 3 of Article 244 of the Criminal Procedure Code , which refers to the measures of Article 20 of the Law "On Police" as identification measures. There are three parts to be checked in this construction:
The first paragraph of Article 20 is related to the first paragraph of Article 19 — establishing the identity “ openly and directly from that person ”, by stopping the person, for the purpose of protecting public safety. This construction describes a situation of on-site, direct contact.
Article 20, paragraph 3 : “Before any measure is taken to identify a person , that person shall be given the opportunity to prove his identity voluntarily within a reasonable time .” There is nothing in the case to indicate that this was done.
Article 244, Part 4 of the Criminal Procedure Code and Article 20, Paragraph 7 of the Police Law : The procedure for responding to violations recorded on photo/video footage and for identification using a special program is determined by the Minister's order . There is no reference to this order and compliance with its requirements anywhere in the case.
Additionally, the person's registration address in the identification protocol is indicated as " Apartment 29 ", while in the extract from the MIA's own database - " Apartment 39 ". Taken separately, this inaccuracy is minor; in the context of the reliability of the biometric facial recognition result, it raises additional questions.
5. Identification and Attribution Standard — A State-of-the-Art Approach to First Instance
The first instance decision made on this issue a day earlier is directly relevant. On September 11, 2026, the Tetritskaro District Court (Judge Vladimer Khuchua ) terminated the administrative offense case initiated under Part 1 of Article 166 of the Criminal Code of Georgia, which also concerned a comment left on Facebook. The case was filed by the same agency — the Hate Speech Combating Division of the Human Rights Protection Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs.
(Methodological clarification: The full text of the decision has not been published; the excerpts below are based on the text released by the court itself, which was made public by the media. The first instance decision does not have precedential force and is considered here as persuasive, not binding, argumentation.)
The court distinguished three facts to be established: who owns the profile, who uses the profile, and who directly carried out the disputed action. There was no data from the Internet provider, no social network, and no expert opinion in the case. In the court's wording:
"It is impossible for a court to establish the fact of a violation of the law by "recognizing" this image alone. No one is obliged to prove their innocence. By law, only an administrative body is obliged to present irrefutable evidence."
"If we assume, even with reasonable doubt, that the profile belongs to a specific person, in this case too it must be proven that he or she directly performed the action (writing a comment or something else) ."
" The legal basis of the protocol on the identification of the alleged offender, presented as the main evidence in the case, is unclear and vague . The court does not discuss the identification indicated in the protocol, the circumstances of which (method, basis, etc.) cannot be clarified at all ."
This implies a two-tiered evidentiary standard: first, the connection of the digital account to a specific person, and then the actual performance of the disputed act by that person; confirmation of the first does not create a presumption of the second. The court specifically emphasized that a person has the right not to respond to the accusation at all and that a lack of evidence cannot be filled by his silence, and that “evidence of a high standard” must be presented.
When transferring to the case under consideration, two reservations are necessary. The first link — the profile’s ownership — is weak for the defense here : the disputed page is a public profile, where the video of this very person is posted, i.e. the “profile created in someone else’s name” argument is actually difficult to establish. However, the second and third links are transferred unchanged : (a) there is no data in the case that would independently connect the act of writing a specific comment with the identified person — neither the provider’s nor the platform’s data, nor the expert’s conclusion; (b) the 31.08.2026 identification protocol indicates uploading to a “special electronic program” and “visual examination of the face,” but the method of operation of the program, the comparison criteria, and the accuracy rate of the result are not clear — i.e. exactly what the Tetritskaro court called “uncertain and vague.”
6. Third party data
The screenshots clearly show the names, profile photos, and comment texts of individuals unrelated to the case. These individuals are neither witnesses nor victims. Compliance with the principle of data minimization is a matter for independent study.
VIII. Conclusion
Four conclusions can be drawn from the analysis of the case under consideration.
First — composition. The first part of Article 166 of the Criminal Code requires three cumulative elements: public space, addressee, and actual violation of order or peace. None of them is established by the case materials. “Public space” is legally undefined, and the only legislative definition that comes close to it is physical-territorial and limited by the purposes of another code; The addressee is not named in the protocol (the victim's column is blank), and the legislator divided responsibility for insults into three norms based on the identity of the addressee (Article 166 - citizens, Part 2 of Article 173 - law enforcement officers, Article 173¹⁶ - officials), which puts the state in an insurmountable trilemma: not naming the addressee removes the composition, naming an official changes the qualification, and naming a foreign citizen does not fit into any norm; and the result is not set anywhere.
The second is the international standard. The case under consideration in the two Georgian cases in Strasbourg is on the side of Peradze , not Miladze . It was the Miladze decision (§§71–72) that distinguished the existence of an identifiable addressee and the proven wide reach; neither of these is present here. Of the five criteria required by §70 of the same decision (content, context, reach, justification, proportionality of the sanction), none of them can be substantiated by evidence.
Third — the process. The protocol is drawn up not at the scene of the action, but in the building of the agency, in the absence of the person, without explanation of rights, without a witness and the victim. According to the established practice of the Supreme Court, drawing up a protocol not at the scene constitutes a “ substantial violation of the procedure ” (№BS-1853-1807(k-10)). According to Part 2 of Article 252 of the Criminal Procedure Code, the presence of a person in a case under Article 166 is mandatory; imposing a penalty in absentia under this article is not permitted by law.
Fourth — evidence. The subject of the accusation is neither dated nor written. The protocol attributes the action to August 18, while the text recorded on that day does not contain an offensive expression; while the verbal insult described in the inspection protocol is dated two months before the post. According to Part 3 of Article 236 of the Criminal Procedure Code, the burden of proof lies entirely with the body, and according to Paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 7 of the Law “On Freedom of Speech and Expression”, every unsubstantiated doubt must be resolved against the restriction of the right. This conclusion is further supported by the decision of the Tetritskaro District Court of September 11, 2026 (first instance, without precedential force), which also concerns the case under Article 166 of the Criminal Procedure Code due to a comment written on Facebook. The court distinguished between proving that a profile belongs to a specific person and proving that the disputed comment was written directly by that person, and explained that merely “identifying” a profile photo is not sufficient to establish the fact of a violation.
Finally, a more general remark that goes beyond the scope of this case. On June 4, 2026, the Supreme Court directly stated that “ there is no valid legislative regulation ” that would unambiguously define the place of action committed in virtual space. According to the Constitutional Court’s standard, when the scope of a norm is not established by the legislator and is supplemented by the judiciary in each individual case, “ the issue of declaring an action punishable is not resolved by the legislator ” (№2/1/1289, II-7). The above-mentioned problem is not solved by resolving a specific case — it requires a legislative response. Until such a response exists, a narrow interpretation of a punitive norm is not a defense tactic, but a requirement of the constitutional principle of certainty.
Sources used
Normative acts
Code of Administrative Offenses (edition No. 639, 24.06.2026): Art. 22 · 38 · 166 · 173 · 173¹⁶ · 208 · 232 · 236 · 239 · 240 · 244 · 252 · 261 · 262
Law of Georgia "On Public Service", Article 3 (subparagraphs "h" and "i")
Criminal Code of Georgia: Article 148 (repealed — 24.06.2004, Law No. 224), Article 366 , Article 387 , Article 353³ (16.10.2025, Law No. 992)
Amending Act: Law of Georgia No. 273-IIMS-XIMP, 06.02.2025 — matsne.gov.ge
Law of Georgia "On Freedom of Speech and Expression": Art. 3 · 4 · 7 · 8 · 9
Law of Georgia "On Police" (edition No. 45, 17.03.2026): Art. 19 · Art. 20
Spatial Planning, Architectural and Construction Code, Art. 3 (“H³”, “H⁴”)
Constitutional Court
№2/2/516,542, 14.05.2013, Aleksandre Baramidze, Lasha Tughushi, Vakhtang Khmaladze and Vakhtang Maisaia against the Parliament of Georgia — matsne.gov.ge
№2/1/1289, 15.07.2021, Giorgi Beruashvili vs. the Parliament of Georgia — constcourt.ge
Ruling No. 2/12/1643, 27.12.2024, Maia Todua and Mikheili Tsurtsumia against the Parliament of Georgia — constcourt.ge
№3/7/679, 29.12.2017, “Broadcasting Company Rustavi 2 LLC” and others ; №1/1/428,447,459, 13.05.2009; №2/3/406,408, 30.10.2008 (cited in the above-mentioned decisions)
Supreme Court
No. BS-422(G-26), 04.06.2026 — supremecourt.ge
No. BS-1853-1807(K-10), 27.12.2011 — supremecourt.ge
No. BS-585-575(K-12), 05.03.2013 — supremecourt.ge
No. BS-785-769(K-12), 05.03.2013 — supremecourt.ge
No. BS-1411(K-22), 23.04.2024 — supremecourt.ge
No. BS-1340(K-20), 30.05.2023 — supremecourt.ge
No. BS-1170(K-19), 18.09.2023 — supremecourt.ge
No. BS-542(K-25), 24.07.2025 — supremecourt.ge
Tetritskaro District Court
Tetritskaro District Court, Decision on Discontinuing the Proceedings of an Administrative Offense Against M.S. Under Article 166, Part 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 2026; Full text not published; Excerpts from the text disseminated by the court, made public on 11.09.2026 — TV Pirveli [11.09.2026]
International assessments
Venice Commission, CDL-AD(2025)001, “Georgia — Urgent Opinion on Amendments to the Code of Administrative Offences and the Law on Assemblies and Demonstrations”, 3 March 2025 (adopted 14–15.03.2025) — venice.coe.int
OSCE/ODIHR, Urgent Opinion FOPA-GEO/564/2025, 12 November 2025 — odihr.osce.org
OSCE/ODIHR, Urgent Opinion FOPA-GEO/536/2025, 14 March 2025 — odihr.osce.org
European Court of Human Rights
Peradze and Others v. Georgia , No. 5631/16, 15.12.2022 — HUDOC
Miladze v. Georgia , No. 41585/23, 19.05.2026 (Request for referral to the Grand Chamber not subject to review) — HUDOC
Savva Terentyev v. Russia , №10692/09, 28.08.2018 — HUDOC
Handyside v. the United Kingdom , No. 5493/72, 07.12.1976 — HUDOC
Lingens v. Austria , No. 9815/82, 08.07.1986 — HUDOC
Castells v. Spain , No. 11798/85, 23.04.1992 — HUDOC
Engel and Others v. the Netherlands , No. 5100/71, etc., 08.06.1976 — HUDOC
Ziliberberg v. Moldova , No. 61821/00, 01.02.2005 — HUDOC
Kasparov and Others v. Russia , №21613/07, 03.10.2013 — HUDOC
Mikhaylova v. Russia , №46998/08, 19.11.2015 — HUDOC
Karelin v. Russia , №926/08, 20.09.2016 — HUDOC
Pélissier and Sassi v. France [Grand Chamber], No. 25444/94, 25.03.1999 — HUDOC
Mattoccia v. Italy , No. 23969/94, 25.07.2000 — HUDOC
Cumpănă and Mazăre v. Romania [Grand Chamber], No. 33348/96, 17.12.2004 — HUDOC
Mariya Alekhina and Others v. Russia , №38004/12, 17.07.2018 — HUDOC
Quotations from the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights in the article are provided in the author's translation from the official English text.
The authors agree that any person against whom an administrative offense case has been initiated under the relevant articles, or an organization working on the protection of the rights of such persons, may use this article for substantiation without prior consent. For use within the amici curiae institute, please write to us at: contact@legal.ge
